NIETZSCHEANA  #8

"On Teleology"
or
"Teleology Since Kant"

Friedrich Nietzsche

A Natural Science Dissertation Draft
(1868)

Translated, and with an Introduction, by
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Translator's Introduction
"On Teleology," or "Teleology Since Kant"
A natural science dissertation draft (1868)
by Friedrich Nietzsche

In the early months of 1868 Nietzsche was working on a project which he had described as a "half philosophic, half natural science" doctoral dissertation, which was to be entitled "On the Concept of the Organic Since Kant." Although Nietzsche indicated in a draft of a letter to Anton Klette in February 1869 that he abandoned this project, the notes which constitute the dissertation draft are the longest sustained inquiry we have on Kant from any of Nietzsche's writings. In this regard, the draft should be of interest for those concerned with Nietzsche's early philosophic development, as well as those interested in his relationship to Kant.

Appearing as "Teleologie Seit Kant" under "Juvenilia" in the Musarion edition (Gesammelte Werke, 1920-29), the early dissertation draft was republished in a slightly different form in the Beck edition (Beck'sche Ausgabe Werke, 1933-40). The editors of the latter edition had planned to publish everything which Nietzsche wrote, but this project was abandoned in WW II after only five volumes appeared. The Beck edition has recently become widely available, as it was republished as Friedrich Nietzsche: Frühe Schriften in 1994.

While the Colli-Montinari edition (Kritische Studienausgabe) has published supplementary volumes in an attempt to compensate for some of its omissions of Nietzsche's early writings, it still remains incomplete. It does not contain the dissertation draft, nor does it contain "Fragment einer Kritik der Schopenhauerischen Philosophie" aka "Zu Schopenhauer," early writings which are essential for understanding Nietzsche's relationship to Kant and Schopenhauer. I will not belabor the point that there is also much other work in Friedrich Nietzsche: Frühe Schriften which warrants further attention, but merely want to point out that consideration of these early writings facilitates a deeper understanding of Nietzsche's relations to important thinkers such as Kant, Schopenhauer, and Democritus. If one wants to take Nietzsche seriously as an original philosopher, it is crucial to examine where he departs from his philosophic mentors.

In its broadest outlines, "Teleologie Seit Kant" responds to Kant's postulation of the "natural purpose" in the "Critique of Teleological Judgment." In that part of the Critique of Judgment, Kant offers the culmination of his biological reflections directed at the unconscious cooperation between the parts and the whole of an organism. Kant clearly recognizes that the "dark side" of the organism is inaccessible to the discursive intellect and consequently the organization of nature "has nothing

1 See Nietzsche's letter to Deussen written in the end of April or the beginning of May, 1868 (BW 568).

2 See Nietzsche's May 3, 1868 letter to Rhode (BW 569).
analogous to any causality that we know." Thus Kant stresses that we think of "natural purposes" only by analogy, so the mode of representation of organisms is transferred from things that we actually do know by an image creating faculty which, strictly speaking, can not yield cognition. Yet Kant loses sight of the analogical nature of the representation of organic beings and moves beyond the organism to offer an expanded representation of teleological order, to consider all of nature as purposively arranged.

In response to Kant's recognition that the discursive intellect can not render the workings of "life" translucent, Nietzsche offers various attempts by "natural philosophers" (i.e. Schopenhauer, Goethe) to deal with Kant's insight. Ultimately, the project investigates what Nietzsche would later refer to in his 1869-70 essay "On the Origin of Language" as that "remarkable antimony" from the Critique of Judgment which makes "the correct understanding of language possible"—that "something can be purposive without consciousness." Clearly Nietzsche agrees with Kant that there is something inaccessible to the discursive intellect which somehow allows a living being to proliferate and maintain itself. Yet Nietzsche parts from Kant by claiming that there is no compulsion to assume that any concept or rational design had to precede the existence of an organism to make it possible. Rather, Nietzsche claims that organisms are nothing but a function of power relationships: we only see organisms that have had the capacity to survive, but this indicates nothing about any external designer.

By presenting an assault on teleology in general, Nietzsche offers his theory of the understanding as an anthropomorphic fictioning power. One scarcely needs to mention that Kant had undermined all of the traditional theoretical proofs for the existence of God, but only in the Critique of Judgment does Kant offer the fruition of his thoughts on teleological judgment. It is this work which prompts Nietzsche's early stress that the discursive understanding is unable to come to grips with life as "eternal becoming."

Rudolf Makkreel has pointed out that the Critique of Judgment is a text which may be interpreted as being unified by the theme of life (Lebensgefühl), while recourse to teleological judgment is sought only after all attempts to explain life mechanistically have been exhausted. Kant offers a peculiar "end" of the critical project which offers no doctrine, but only a critique of the power of reflective judgment: a non-cognitive, non-ethical way of thinking. Nietzsche's response to Kant is concerned explicitly with teleological judging, as Nietzsche ultimately thinks that Kant has shown that the human understanding is much like an artist's easel, for the "aesthetic" postulation of unities is more fundamental than any moral or

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5 *Kritik der Urtheilskräft* Hamburg: Meiner, 1990. (KU/65). All references are by section number.

1 This essay has been translated in *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language* (Oxford University Press, 1990). The reference to the *Critique of Judgment* has been translated incorrectly as the *Critique of Pure Reason* (p. 211).

2 See Kant's second introduction, section 2 (Ak 176).
epistemological discourse. Although Kant does not arrive at the same conclusion, Nietzsche suggests that human beings are "deeper" artists than they are aware, since they are the authors of the ideas of force, matter, individuals, law, organism, atom, purposive cause... These are not constitutive judgments, but only reflective judgments." Elements from Nietzsche's later "falsification thesis" clearly are already present in this work, as he suggests that the human understanding invents identities that do not exist "outside" of human consciousness.

A peculiar similarity between aesthetic and teleological judgment is disclosed in Kant's final critique, a kinship which is Nietzsche's point of departure. Kant states that the Critique of Judgments portrait of reflective judgment offers us the key to reconcile the seemingly divergent realms of nature and freedom from the first two critiques. Thus there is a very different power of the imagination revealed in this work that had not been explored by Kant in the earlier critiques: there is a strange way of presenting the world that strives to make experience coherent, a way of viewing things that indicates the imagination is not merely in the service of the understanding, but has a freedom of its own. In this regard, any attempt to provide a dialogue of Nietzsche and Kant which only considers Kant's first critique and moral theory will be incomplete, as Kant's epistemology and moral theory are not the whole story. The Critique of Judgment proves to be important not only for assessing Kant's legacy, but also for examining Nietzsche's longest sustained inquiry on Kant.

The core question which animates "Teleology Since Kant" is whether organic beings are the product of intelligent design, or whether they are products of chance, generated by accident. Obviously much hinges on such a question in terms of traditional teleological proofs for the existence of god. Kant had already concluded the critical project with the peculiar assembly of aesthetic and teleological judgments in one text, a discourse which in some respects had already relegated teleology to the free play of the imagination. It is at that juncture, at the "end" of the critical project, at which Nietzsche is prompted to conclude that "Teleology is, like optimism, only an aesthetic product."

In the translation which follows, I generally follow the Beck version, indicating where it has slight variations from the Musarion edition. The former lists Nietzsche's citations of pagination from Kant, Schopenhauer, and Goethe, while the latter omits these details. This may not seem terribly significant, but the correspondence of Nietzsche's page citations of the Critique of Judgment with the Rosenkranz edition of 1838 indicates that Nietzsche did read Kant first hand, in spite of also relying heavily on Kuno Fischer's lectures on Kant (among other sources) in the Geschichte der neuern Philosophie.

Nietzsche's preoccupation with the role and significance of teleology in this early work demonstrates a continuity with his even earlier Democritus research project. Democritus is the ancient atomist censured by Aristotle for ruling out all teleological causes. Friedrich Lange's view that

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6 Yet Kant still believes that no animal can be explained without employing concepts of intelligent design or purpose. Although Nietzsche recognizes that there is something mysterious about living organisms, his dissertation draft deliberately sets out to attack this claim of Kant's.
the elimination of cryptic and spurious teleologies is a necessary condition for the development of scientific rigor clearly had a profound impact on Nietzsche's philosophic reflection during this period. It is plainly difficult to overstate the mammoth impact Lange had on Nietzsche, especially with regard to Nietzsche's understanding of Kant's philosophy.

There is also a similarity of Nietzsche's dissertation draft to Hume's *Enquiry Concerning The Human Understanding*, since Hume utilizes Democritus's atomistic heir, Epicurus, as a mouthpiece through which he undermines claims about any order bestowed upon nature by an intelligent designer. Using Epicurus as a literary device, Hume writes: "You forget that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or at least without any foundation in reason; and that you have no ground to ascribe to him qualities, but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions." Similarly, Nietzsche's assault on teleology is partially indebted to the ancient schools of atomism.7

One final important note is in order about the time when this work was done by Nietzsche: it is written less than 10 years after the appearance of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection*. Attempting to explain how life originates without recourse to an intelligent designer had already been tried by Empedocles, and Nietzsche notes elsewhere that Empedolcs anticipates elements of Darwin's theory. When we look at organisms, we are given a sampling that only showcases the combinations that had features to permit survival, so the inference that there is evidence of conscious design exhibited in the organism itself is erroneous according to Nietzsche, for the half-successful and unsuccessful attempts to live would not have been taken into consideration, since they had been fated to be destroyed.

The notes which follow demonstrate a unity of thought, but still do not constitute a polished work. I have consulted the only prior English translation of *Teleology Since Kant* which appears in an appendix of Claudia Crawford's *The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Theory of Language*, de Gruyter press. By translating *Zweckmässigkeit* as "purposiveness" rather than "expediency," the literal stress on "purpose" which is present in the German is reflected in my translation. Elsewhere I have argued that there are other problems with the prior translation of this work, particularly in regards to the issue of "casualism" in an otherwise rigorous and interesting analysis by Professor Crawford.*

Although any errors or oversights in the following work are my own, special thanks are in order to various persons who have made helpful suggestions and important criticism in the stages of revision of this translation, especially Brent Peterson, Wilhelm Wurzer, Rudolf Makkreel, and Babette Babich. I have inserted brackets <[ ]> within the text to identify the sections Nietzsche quotes

7 There is also significant evidence that Nietzsche's thought of the eternal return may be indebted to the ancient atomism of Lucretius, a connection which George Stack and others have explored.


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from Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, along with the corresponding section numbers; where Nietzsche refers to section numbers himself I have copied rounded brackets <( )> from the text. In both cases, I have abbreviated the *Critique of Judgment* with 'KU.' I hope that this work will provide additional foundation for a genealogy of Nietzsche's philosophy. A sustained critical rigor is prominent in this early phase that offers us what may be Nietzsche's earliest statement of a theory of the understanding, a theory that begins with a critique of Kant's portrait of reflective judgment.

Paul Swift
Teleology Since Kant
(1868)
Friedrich Nietzsche

Kant wants to show that "a necessity exists for us to think of organic bodies as premeditated—to think of them as created according to concepts of purpose." I can grant that this is only one way to account for natural bodies, to explain them to oneself according to teleology.

Human experience proceeds by analogy to set aside concepts of purpose which still are accidental: however, the origin of purposiveness in natural bodies is not a mediated product. In other words, the origin of organic bodies is due to the fortuitous working together of talent and fate, the draw of the lottery. From an infinite number of chances to generate organic bodies, there must also be the emergence of some bodies that turn out to be advantageous or purposive.

The necessity of which Kant speaks no longer exists in our time: but one is reminded, however, "that even Voltaire held the teleological proof to be irrefutable." Optimism and teleology go hand in hand: both set out to deny that the unpurposeful is something which is actually unpurposeful. To take arms against teleology in general is the task at hand—to offer a proof of unpurposefulness. Through this it would only be shown that the highest reason had worked sporadically, and that there is also a terrain of lesser reasons given. There is thus no unified teleological world, but rather, a creative intelligence.

The assumption of a unified teleological world would have been made only according to a human analogy: why can the purposive not be an unconscious creative power, i.e., which nature produces? One thinks of the instinct of the animal. This is the standpoint of natural philosophy.

One no longer posits the knowing as lying outside of the world.

But we remain stuck in metaphysics and must bring in the thing-in-itself. Finally a solution can be reached from a strictly human standpoint: the Empedoclean, where

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"Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation (Clinton, Mass: Falcon's Wing Press, 1958) appendix. Hereafter referred to as WWV.

"Schopenhauer writes this in chapter 26 as well as in the appendix of the criticism of the Kantian philosophy in The World as Will and Representation. Nietzsche uses the term unbezwinglich rather than Schopenhauer's unwiderleglich.

"Nietzsche's discourse is accentuating Schopenhauer's natural philosophy here: Schopenhauer's strange exposition of Kant's thing-in-itself animates this discourse. One should note the radically different sense in which Schopenhauer employs Kant's concept of the "thing-in-itself." For Kant the thing-in-itself is chiefly (but not exclusively) employed as a limiting concept, whereas Schopenhauer often uses it to indicate that which cannot be discursively grasped: in this case it refers to the "mystery of life" which lies beyond the epistemological limit.
the purposive appears only as an accident arising from much unpurposiveness.\textsuperscript{12}

Two metaphysical solutions are attempted: one is a coarse anthropological attempt which places an idealistically human conception external to the world; the other, which is also metaphysical, takes flight into an intelligible world, in which the purpose of things is immanent.

The purposive is the exception.
The purposive happens by chance.
The purposive reveals itself as being completely without reason.
One must eliminate every theological interest from the question.

\textbf{Teleology Since Kant}

Nature philosophically considered.

The organism as a simple idea is shattered in the multiplicity of its parts and its condition, but it continues as unity in the necessary unification of its parts and functions. This unity [the idea of an organism] is made by the intellect.

"The purposiveness of the organic, the lawfulness of the inorganic are brought into nature by our understanding.\textsuperscript{13}"

This idea, expanded, yields the explanation of an externally conceived purposiveness. The thing-in-itself must "indicate its unity in the agreement of all its appearances with one another.\textsuperscript{14}" "All the parts of nature accommodate each other because a single will is there.\textsuperscript{15}

But in opposition to the whole theory forms that horrible struggle of the individuals (which also manifest themselves as an idea) and the species. The explanation thus presupposes a teleology throughout: it does not exist. The difficulty is precisely in the connection of the teleological and non-teleological world.

The status of the problems.
Kant's rejection of attempts at solution.
Solutions of the natural philosophers.
Critique of Kant's view.

\textsuperscript{12} See Aristotle's \textit{Physics} (2.2, 2.8) and \textit{On The Parts of The Animals} (1.1) for what Nietzsche refers to elsewhere as the "Empedoclean insight." Empedocles held that most of the parts of animals came to be by chance. Nietzsche notes Lange's observation that "the Empedoclean insight" which Democritus assimilated corresponds to Darwin's theory (BAW 4 54). Thus Nietzsche also stresses that organisms are not the result of design, but products of chance.

\textsuperscript{13} (WWV 1 157).

\textsuperscript{14} (WWV 1 157).

\textsuperscript{15} (WWV 1 160).
The question has a similarity to that of seeking after the freedom of the human will, in that it sought its solutions in the realm of the intelligible world, while it overlooked a coordinated possibility.

There is no question that exists which requires the necessary assumption of an intelligible world for its solution.

Teleology: intrinsic purposiveness. We see a complicated machine, which maintains itself and can not devise any other structure which could construct it more simply. But that only means that the machine maintains itself, thus it is viewed as purposive. A judgment about the "highest purposiveness" does not belong to us. We could at best infer that there is a reason, but we have no justification to indicate whether such judgments about purposiveness are higher or lower.

An externally conceived purposiveness is an illusion. In opposition to it, we recognize the method of nature as it generates such "purposive" bodies, through a senseless method. Consequently, purposiveness proves itself to be only a capacity for life, that is to say, as the cond. sine qua non for life. Chance can hit upon the most beautiful melody.

Secondly, we know the method of nature, as it would maintain itself as a purposive body: with senseless thoughtlessness.

But teleology throws out many questions which are unsolvable or which have not been solvable until now.

The organism of the world, as well as the origin of evils, do not belong here, but are examples that originate from the intellect.

Is it necessary to oppose teleology with an explained world? It only indicates another reality of a domain that has fixed limits. The position that opposes the rejection of teleology claims that teleology allows the logical laws themselves to be disclosed further on higher levels; but we are not permitted to speak of logical laws.

**Purposiveness**

We see a method for the attainment of purposes, or more correctly; we see existence and its means and infer that its means are purposive. Therein lies still not the recognition of a high, let alone the highest degree of reason.

We are astonished of the complexity of organic beings and then presume (after human analogy) a special wisdom lying within. The wonder in us is actually organic life: All the means it uses to maintain itself we call purposive. Why do we suspend the concept of purposiveness in the inorganic world? Because we have pureunities here, but not unities belonging with each other in parts working together.

The elimination of teleology has a practical value. Only then is it possible for the concept of a higher reason to be removed: thus we are already satisfied.

The evaluation of teleology in its value for the ideas of the human world:

Teleology is, like optimism, only an aesthetic product.

The strict necessity of cause and effect rules out the purposes in unconscious nature. Because purposive representations are not generated in nature, they must lie here extrinsically, as outside the causality and consequently they must become viewed as a motive inserted here and there,
wherethrough even the strict enduring necessity would be broken. Existence is perforated with wonders.

Teleology as purposiveness and effect always pushes conscious intelligence further. One asks for the purpose of this isolated interference and one is confronted with the purely arbitrary.

"Order and disorder are not in Nature." 16

"We ascribe effects to the accidental, whose connection to the causes we do not see." 17

Things exist, consequentially they must be able to exist, that is to say, they must have the conditions for existence:

When the human being constructs something, i.e., wants to make something capable of existence, he thus reflects under what conditions this can happen. After the fact, he names the conditions for the existence of his fabricated work purposive. Therefore he also calls the conditions for the existence of the thing purposive, that is to say, only by virtue of this assumption would they originate as a human creation.

When a person pulls out a ticket from an urn and does not win the death lottery, this is neither unpurposive nor purposive, but as they say, by chance, i.e., without any thought preceding it. But this is the condition of his continuing existence.

Is it true that Democritus would hold that the origin of language arose out of convenience? 18

"The organization of nature has nothing analogous to any actual causality that we know", (that means the organism), says Kant in the Critique of Teleological Judgment (p. 258). 19 [KU 65].

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17 In the Beck edition, the following passage appears which has been omitted from the Musarion: "Much Comic in the Minor Writings of Brockes s. Strauss in the Stoics v. Zeller B. 4.

18 This sentence, which is not present in the Musarion edition, prompts one to consider it in light of Nietzsche's 1869 essay, "On the Origin of Language," where he writes that "the right knowledge [concerning the origin of language] has become common only since Kant, who in the *Critique of Judgment* both recognized teleology in nature and at the same time stressed the remarkable antinomy that something can be purposive without a consciousness." According to Proclus, "Pythagoras and Epicurus agree with Cratylus, but Democritus and Aristotle agree with Hermogenes, the former that names arise by nature, the latter that they arise by chance...Democritus thought that the proof of their chance origin was fourfold: (1) the calling of different things by the same name; (2) having several names for the same thing; (3) change of name; (4) lack of name." Freeman, *Ancilla To the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948) p. 97. "Convenience" might better be understood as "convention" in this context, insofar as there is a chance origin of language and teleology in that both indicate something that does not exist by nature, but is a product of human convention. In any case, language is viewed here, like organisms are, as a contingent structure.

19 The page numbers which Nietzsche cites from Schopenhauer, Goethe, and Kant have been
"An organized product of nature is that in which all is a purpose and reciprocally a means" (p. 260, [KU 66]).

"Each living thing", says Goethe, "is not a singularity, but a plurality: it is itself insofar as it appears to us as individual, though it still remains as a collection of living self-supporting being." (Goethe, B. 36, p. 7, Introduction of Structure and Change of Organic Nature).

It is very important for Goethe (for natural philosophy in general, intuition of the power of judgment)" (B. 40 p. 425) for the origin of his natural philosophy out of a Kantian principle.

"What the understanding knows through its concept of nature is nothing but the effect of moving force, i.e. Mechanism." "That which can not be known through a merely mechanistic understanding does not belong to exact natural science."

"Mechanistic explanation means explanation by external causes."

"Specification from external causes is not able to explain nature." "But we have nothing without cause." Thus we must think inner causes, namely, purposes which are representations.

"A way of viewing things is still not knowledge."

"The principle of such a necessary way of viewing things must be a concept of reason." "The only principle of this kind is natural purposiveness."

"Through the concept of a mechanical lawfulness one can explain the architecture of the world, but no organisms would be explained."

omitted in the Musarion edition; appearing in the Beck edition, the pagination cited by Nietzsche corresponds to the pagination in the Rosenkranz edition of Kant (volume 4) which also includes Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schonen und Erhabenen (Leipzig, 1838); the page numbers do not correspond to Kuno Fischer's quotes of Kant, so it appears that Nietzsche was working with Kant's third critique with a first hand acquaintance.

30 The parenthetical citation "for philosophy in general, intuition of the power of judgment" is only present in the Musarion edition.

31 The Nachbericht in the Beck edition refers this quote and the ones which follow it to Kuno Fischer's second volume on Kant in the Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. These quotes (which are not enclosed in quotation marks in the Musarion edition) do not come directly from Kuno Fischer, but appear to follow Fischer's reading nonetheless, i.e. these are Nietzsche's interpolations of Fischer.
"It is impossible to represent natural purposiveness as inhering in the matter."

"Matter is only outer appearance" [KRV a359].

"The purposiveness of things can always only be valid in relation to intelligence, with which the insight of a thing is in correspondence." And certainly "either in our own or in a foreign intelligence is the ground on which the thing itself lies. In the last case, the intention of the existence of the things would be revealed in the appearance." In other cases, only our representation of things would be judged purely as purposive. This last kind of purposiveness relates itself only to the form ("in the simple observation of the object the imagination and intelligence are harmonized").

"Only through the mechanistic origination is the thing cognizable."

A class of things is not knowable.

We understand only mechanism.

Through mechanistic origination a thing is cognizable, but we do not know whether this gives us something completely different. It is determined by our organization that we are only able to understand a mechanistic generation of the thing.

Now there is also (says Kant) a compulsion in our organization which makes us believe in organisms.

From the standpoint of human nature:

We know only mechanism.

We do not know the organism.

But even mechanism, as well as the organism, is not able to give the thing-in-itself.

The organism is a form. We overlook the form's multiplicity."

The organic body is a substance, the parts of which are bound together with one another purposively. Therefore, we long for causes which bind together the parts of a substance purposively; i.e., Kant says (sec 65, 66) "organizing causes, which must actually become thought of as working according to purposes."

But therein lies a fault. It is only necessary to point out another possibility to remove Kant's presentation concerning the compulsion to view organic bodies as premeditated. Mechanism bound with casualism yields this possibility."

That which Kant claims—he claims according to a bad analogy: since it namely follows his acknowledgement that "nothing in the relationship of purposiveness gives it a similarity to the organism." (KU 65)

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29 In the Beck edition the following outline appears immediately after this paragraph:

I. The organism as a product of our organization

II. The mathematical alone is knowable

III. [blank]

29 "The casualistic principle refers matter to a physical basis for its form" (Critique of Judgment 72 391). Kant writes "attributed to Epicurus or Democritus—it is so manifestly absurd, if taken literally, that we must not let it detain us."
The purposiveness originates as a special case of possibilities: an innumerable quantity of forms originate from mechanistic combination: from these innumerable forms there can also be some which have the capacity for life.

The hypothesis is living beings are able to originate out of mechanism. Kant denies that.

In truth, it stands firmly that we only cognize the mechanistic. That which is beyond our concepts is wholly unknowable. The origin of the organic is thus hypothetical, as we represent it to ourselves as if a human understanding would be present. Yet the concept of the organic is only human: One must point out the analogy. The ability to live originates under an enormous number of possibilities incapable of life. With this insight, we bring ourselves closer to resolving the problem of the organism.

We see that many capacities for life originate and would maintain themselves and then observe the method.

Laws of force, these and capacities for life which act in the production and preservation of the organism would be the selfsame: thus this is very unreasonable.

But this is the assumption of teleology:

"The idea of effect is [...] the concept of the whole" (KU 65). "In organisms the active principle is the [...] idea of a created effect" (KU 65).

However, the concept of the whole is our work. This is where the source of the representation of purposes lies. The concept of the whole does not lie in the thing, but in us. But once again, these unities which we call organisms are still multiplicities. There are in reality no individuals. Moreover, individuals and organisms are nothing but abstractions. They are unities manufactured by us into which we transfer the idea of purpose.

We assume that the force which brings about organisms of a certain kind is a unitary one. Then the method is to observe this force of the organisms which allows them to create and preserve themselves.

Here it is demonstrated that what we call purposive is only that which proves itself to be capable of living.

The secret is only "life."

Is this also only an idea conditioned by our organization?

"The raging wastefulness astonishes us." Schopenhauer says (World as Will and Representation volume II, p. 375 [Chapter 26]): "The works of nature cost her no trouble." Therefore she is indifferent to their destruction.

Schopenhauer thinks that there is an analogy to the organ (WWR a.a.O.) to "The movement of the will, the motive that directs it (final cause)"

Goethe's Attempt

The Metamorphosis has to do with the explanation of the organic according to the efficient cause.
Each *efficient* cause ultimately borders on something which is unfathomable. (That even proves that this is the correct human path).

Therefore one does not ask for final causes from inorganic nature, because there are no individuals there, but mere forces to be observed. In other words, because we can resolve everything mechanistically, we no longer believe in purposes.

'we have] complete insight only into what we can ourselves make and accomplish according to concepts' [KU 69]

A false opposition

When in nature only mechanistic powers rule, the purposive appearances are only fictitious—
their *purposiveness* is only *our idea*. Blind powers act unintentionally—thus they can not produce purposiveness.

The capacity for life is constructed from an unending chain of failing and half-successful attempts.

Life, the existence of the organism proves no higher intelligence: In general, it exhibits no continuous measure of intelligence.

The existence of the organism points only to blindly acting forces.

1. Elimination of the expanded representation of teleology.
2. Limits of the concept. The purposive in nature.
3. Purposiveness is equivalent to the capacity for existence.
4. Organisms as multiplicities and unities.

"The *representation* of the *whole* as cause is thought according to purpose" [KU 77]...but the "*whole*" itself is only a representation.

Kant [KU 77]:

Is it "possible that organisms originate purely mechanistically? [Kant says] It is impossible for us to infer that life is mechanistically generated." Why? The understanding is discursive, not intuitive: "it can grasp the whole only in its parts and put them together." But in organisms 'the parts are conditioned through the whole. Now the understanding fails to proceed to the whole, for the whole is not given in the intuition but rather it is only given in the representation. The representation of the whole shall thus condition the parts: the representation of the whole as cause, in other words, as purpose."

"When grasping the whole out of the parts, the understanding proceeds mechanistically. When grasping the given parts from the whole; it can only derive them from the *concept* of the whole."

In short, an intuition of the organism is lacking.

A polemic in accordance with nature.
First of all it would be denied that the whole of an organism really exists. In other words, the concept of unity would prove to be inserted by the human organization. Thus from there we are not allowed to go beyond.

In organisms, not only are the parts conditioned by the whole, but also the whole by the parts. Thus if others are mechanistically generated from the organism, they must also be mechanistically derivable.

It is given that we can only see one side. Now the parts are next observed and broken down into their parts. Thus one arrives at the cell.

Under the supposition that the organisms are generated mechanistically: But if a purposive concept would also be active, thus it would happen in spite of its creation through mechanism (as Kant acknowledges). Thus there must be a mechanism that can be traced.

The generatio aequivoeta unproved (*unerwiesen*). 39

Purposive causes, just as mechanism, are human modes of intuition. Purity would only be known in the mathematical.

The law (in inorganic nature) is, as law, something which is analogous to purposive causes.

"That in nature which is not composed by pure mechanism ...is not an object of the understanding."

It allows only the strictly mathematical in nature to be explained.

"To explain things mechanistically means to explain things according to external causes." (This definition would be introduced, then later set into opposition against the internal).

To explain things mechanistically means much more....

"We have complete insight only into what we can ourselves make and accomplish according to concepts" [KU 68].

Thus one can have complete insight only into the mathematical (thus the formal view). In all other cases, one stands in the unknown. To overcome this, human beings invent concepts, but these are only the sum of apparent qualities combined together, which do not get ahold of the thing.

Therein belongs force, matter, individuals, law, organism, atom, purposive cause. These are not constitutive, but only reflective judgments.

Under mechanism, Kant understands the world without purposive causes: the world of causality.

We can not represent crystallization to ourselves without the idea of effect.

The origin and maintenance of organic beings—to what extent do they have to do with purposive causes?

Compare Kant on purposes of nature regarding the creation and preservation of individuals and the species with ([KU] 62). Then Kant substitutes the concept of a thing at ([KU] 63) and loses sight of the general forms of purposiveness.

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39 This sentence does not appear in the Musarion edition.
The chance happening of a thing's form in relation to reason (is also found with the crystal).

"A thing exists as natural purpose when it is from itself both cause and effect" [KU 64]. This sentence is not deduced. A single case is given.

The derivation that organisms are the single kind of natural purpose is not successful. On the contrary, in nature a machine also would already be led by purposive causes.

The concept of purposiveness is only the capacity for existence. Nothing can be said about the measure of reason disclosed within it.

"It is something different, says Kant [KU 67], to consider a thing according to its intrinsic form and to regard the existence of this thing as a purpose of nature. Therefore, the unpurposive method of preservation and reproduction of an organism does not continuously struggle with the purposiveness itself."

In opposition to this, to say that this organism is purposive is the same as saying this organism is capable of life. Thus it is not the case that the existence of this thing is a purpose of nature, but what we call purposive is nothing other than that which we find capable of life in a thing and as a result, we call those conditions purposive.

Whoever describes nature's method toward preservation as being unpurposive, observes even the existence of a thing as a purpose of nature.

The concept of natural purpose remains fixed only in the organism. "But" says Kant: "this concept leads necessarily to the idea of collective nature as a system after the rule of purpose" [KU 67]. "Through the example which nature gives to us in her organic production one is justified to anticipate nothing from her and her laws, except that which is purposive for the whole" [KU 67].

This reflection comes only from the position in which one
1. disregards the subjectivity of purposive concepts
2. conceives nature as a unity,
3. conceives nature also as capable of a unity of means.

p. 267

"If one thus in the context of natural science brings in the concept of God in order to make purposiveness in nature explainable, and then afterwards needs this purposiveness again to prove there is a god, then there is in neither science nor theology an inner stability and a deceptive circle brings each into uncertainty, through which their borders are allowed to jump over each other" [KU 68].

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"This page citation refers to the quote which immediately follows from the fourth volume of the Rosenkranz edition of Kant, ibid.

"The following outline from the Musarion edition is here omitted from the Beck version, but the
To exclude the method of nature from preservation and generation of organisms in general is not the Empedoclean insight, but probably the Epicurean. But that presupposes that chance can throw together organized being; while here the disputed point lies. From letters a tragedy itself can be thrown together (against Cicero), out of meteorites an earth: but the question is what "life" is, whether it is a mere ordering and form principle (as in the case of tragedy) or something wholly different. Against this it is given intrinsically that for organic nature in the conditions of the organism, no other principle exists other than those of inorganic nature. The method of nature in her treatment of things is the same. She is an impartial mother, equally harsh to her inorganic and organic children.

Chance rules unconditionally, the opposite of purposiveness in nature. The storm which pushes things around is by chance. That we can know. Here arises the question: Is the force which makes the things the same one as that which maintains them? etc.

In an organic being the parts are purposive for its existence, in other words, it would not live if the parts were un purposive. But with that not a single part is yet determined. The part is a form of purposiveness, but it is still not settled whether this is the single possible form. The whole conditions nothing necessary within the parts, while the parts necessarily condition the whole. Whoever maintains the former also maintains that there is the highest purposiveness, i.e., from among the different possible forms of purposiveness of the parts, the highest purposiveness is selected: in so doing, one accepts that there is a hierarchy of purposiveness.

Now which is the idea of effect? Is it life under its own necessary conditions? Is it an idea of an effect shared in common by all organisms?

So is it life in one form under the necessary conditions for that purpose? But the form and the conditions here happen together. In other words, if the form as cause would be posited, the measure of purposiveness would thus be equivalent to the cause thought within—because life in a form is quite certainly an organism. What is the organism other than form, formed life?

But if we say the parts of an organism would not be necessary, we would also say the form of the organism is not necessary. In other words, we posit the organic where it is nothing outside of the form. But outside that it is still simply life. Thus our principle is: for life there are different forms, in other words, multiple purposivenesses. Life is possible under an astonishing number of forms. Each of these forms is purposive: but because a countless number of forms exist, there is thus also a countless number of purposive forms.

In human life, we create hierarchies of purposiveness: we are the ones who first posit occurrences as being equally "reasonable," only when a choice is narrowed. If the human being in a complex situation finds a single purposive path, thus we say he acts reasonably. But if he wants to

latter affixes it to the end of the draft:

Chapter 1. Concept of purposiveness (as capacity for life).
Chapter 2. Organism (the indeterminate concept of life, the indeterminate concept of the individual).
Chapter 3. The ostensible impossibility of mechanistic explanation of the organism (what does mechanistic mean?)
Chapter 4. The recognized purposelessness of nature in contradiction to purposiveness.
journey in the world and takes whatever path he pleases, he thus acts purposively, but still not according to reason. Therefore a reason for being does not disclose itself in the "purposiveness" of organisms.

That "which is thus the idea of the effect of cause" is only the form of life. Life itself can not be thought of as purpose, because life is already presupposed in order to be able to act in accordance with purposes.

When we speak about purposive concepts and purposive causes, we thus mean: from a living and thinking being a form would be intended from which life would appear. In other words, we approach through final causes not an explanation of life, but only its form.

Now we generally grasp in a living being nothing but forms. The eternal becoming is life; through the nature of our intellects we grasp only forms: our intellect is too blunt to perceive the perpetual change: that which is knowable to it, is called form. In truth, no form can be given, because in each point an infinity dwells. Each unity (point) thought depicts a line.

A similar concept as the form is the concept of the individual. Organisms are thus spoken of as unities, as purpose centers. But they exist only as unities for our intellect. Each individual has an infinity of living individuals in himself. The unity is only a coarse intuition, perhaps first inferred from the bodies of humans.

All "forms" can become thrown out but life!

By "The idea of the whole as cause" it is said that the whole conditions the parts, nothing further: since it is self-evident that the parts make the whole. When one speaks of purposive causes, one only means that the form of the whole floats before it in images of the parts—that a form could not have originated mechanically.

Life, including generation, is not to be confined under purposive causes. Life as "self-organizing" is derived arbitrarily by Kant.

Does one need purposive causes in order to explain that something lives? No, only to explain how it lives.

Do we need purposive causes to explain the life of a thing?

No, to us "life" is something wholly dark, through which no light can shine through by purposive causes. We seek only to make the forms of life clear to ourselves. When we say "the dog lives" and then ask "Why does the dog live?", that can not belong here. For here we have taken "life" as equivalent to "being there." The question "why something is" belongs to the externally conceived teleology and lies completely out of our area (Childish anthropomorphic example[s] also by Kant).

We can not mechanically explain the dog, that means he is a living being.

The form is all that appears on the visible surface of "life." The contemplation according to purposive causes is thus a contemplation according to forms.

Actually, we are also required to question the springing up of crystal according to purposive causes.

In other words: teleological observation and the consideration of organisms do not

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This may refer to Kant's critique of Spinoza's concept of transcendental perfection of a thing, which Kant calls a "childish play with words rather than concepts." (KU 73).
synchronize with each other, but rather teleological observation and the consideration of organisms happen according to forms. Purposes and forms are identical in nature.

When the natural philosopher holds that an organism can be generated out of "accident," i.e., not according to purposive causes, he thus means that the form is added after. He asks himself only what "life" is.

What justification do we have from the mode of appearance of a thing, to conceive of a dog as pre-existing for example? The form is something only for us. We think of it as cause, so we lend the appearance the value of the thing-in-itself.

"Purposiveness" is only said in the context of "life." Thus it is not in reference to the forms of life. Thus in the concept of purposiveness there does not lie any recognition of rationality.

What shall be conceived of as the "idea of the effect of a cause" can not be life, but only the form, i.e., a mode of the appearance of a thing would be designated as pre-existing and real.

A thing lives—thus its parts are purposive: the life of the thing is the purpose of its parts. But there are countless different ways to live, i.e. countless forms, that is to say, parts.

The purposiveness is not absolute, but is very relative: from other perspectives, it is often seen as unpurposiveness.

Purposive cause means: the idea of a whole would be indicated as cause—a phenomenal form (Erscheinungsform) would be indicated as real and pre-existing. The concept of the whole relates itself only to the form, not to "life".

1. It is not the case that "a `life' is created, so a form for life must have been sought out,"
2. but rather, "under a succession of forms shall a `life' appear."

It is impossible for the concept to grasp life: thus it does not belong to "the idea of the whole,"
On the possibility of an origination of organisms by "chance", "unpurposiveness" (Mechanism). Kant considers the possibility, but denies the possibility of knowing it.

The method of nature treats the organic and inorganic equally. When the possibility of mechanism is there, thus there is also the possibility of knowing it. But "our understanding is discursive." But that suffices also when mechanism is explained.

The individual is an insufficient concept. What we see of life is form; how we see life forms is as individuals. What lies within them is unknowable.

Procreation is not confined under purposive causes, since purposive causes ask "to which purpose shall a being become?" This belongs only in an external teleology, i.e., in a system of natural purposes.

A system of natural purposes has the following principles against itself:
1. The subjectivity of purposive concepts is taken as objective.

"The Musarion edition has the following outline here which the Beck version affixes to the end of the draft:
Chapter 1 Teleological observation is observation according to forms.
Chapter 2 Forms (individuals) belong to and are inferred from the human organization.
Chapter 3 Lifeforce.

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2. Nature is conceived as a unity
3. and nature is conceived as capable of a unity of means.

Is a thing therefore not purposive because it is mechanically generated? Kant holds this. Why can not chance bring forth purposiveness? He had it right when he said that the purposiveness lies only in our idea.

Life occurs with sensation: thus as a condition for the "organic" we observe sensation.

Life is conceived as conscious, i.e., to exist according to human analogy.

The question concerning organisms is the following: from where in nature does the human similarity come? By a deficiency of self-consciousness?

We cannot represent "life" to ourselves, i.e., the sensory, growing existence, in any other way than one that is analogous to the human. Human beings recognize something in nature similar to the human analogy and some which are unfamiliar for which an explanation is asked.

I have observed that one also often thinks continuously in sleep: a chance awakening instructs one about those scraps of thoughts which still fasten thoughts in one's head.

Do we understand the unconscious co-operation of individual parts with the whole of an organism?

In inorganic nature, i.e., in the architecture of the universe, lawfulness and purposiveness are very much indeed to be thought of as consequence of mechanism. "In that Kant saw a necessity of a plan, the opposite of chance" (Kuno Fischer, History of Modern Philosophy, Volume III, chapter 7, section 2).

Highly noteworthy point "to me it seems one could say in a certain state without arrogance—give me matter and I will show you how a world from that shall be generated—etc. (Kant, Universal Natural History and Theory of The Heavens, Second Part, Preface)."

What Hamann said about Kant's optimism (Attempt at Some Observations About Optimism) is valid for optimism in general: "his notions are blind puppies, who are thrown out by a hasty bitch....He calls upon the whole itself in order to judge the world. For that purpose it is a knowledge that is no longer even bunglery. To infer from the whole to the fragments is the same as going from the unknown to the known" (Hamann's letter to Lindner of October 12, 1759).

It is very difficult for Kant to transfer himself into a different philosophic idiom: this is very characteristic for an original thinker.

Beautiful words against the theological standpoint in the context of teleology:

"It is something very absurd to anticipate enlightenment from reason and yet to prescribe

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39 Compare with Philosophy in the Tragic Age of The Greeks, sec. 17; this quote appears in Fischer's second volume on Kant, p. 494.

30 Kuno Fischer, first volume, p. 211.
beforehand which side she must necessarily favor" (KRV II section 62).\footnote{This passage also is quoted by Schopenhauer in \textit{On the Will in Nature}.}